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Regional Policy
Much of the wealth of the European Community lies within the golQen triangle
created by Eirmingham, Dortmund and Paris. This central, heavlly industrialised areg of
the Community has drawn much of its manpower frun the peripheral regions over a long
period. Community regional policy aims to reduce 
-the great differences that exist'between 
regions by giving financial assistance to development proigcls in the lgss'
favoured ones. Geierally speaking, these are areas where farming is dfficult but 
-where-there is heavy dependence by local people on agriculture; where induslry is declining;
and where t'here is a high rate of unemployment and from which people migrate to
find jobs.' - Paul Henri Spaak saw the need for Community action to help underdeveloped
regions during negotiations in 1956 leading to the signing of t-he Tregty^of Rome, but it
has taken neirly-2| years to launch a European regional policy withfinancial teeth. It
allowsfor a total of 1,3 billion units of account ({542 million) to be spent in the three_
years i975-77, with 300 million units of account (f!15 ynillion) tlb year and 500-
'million (t208 million) in the succeeding two yedrs. The Regional Development Fund
( RDF) is not simply a means by which rich members of the EEC subsidise poor members
or a substitute.for national regional development efforts. The aim is to bring together
national regional policies and from them to build up cotnmon Community objectives.
Coherent pTanning in deprived areas is a vital objective of the RDF and by the end-of-
next year-projects submitted must be part of a full-scale programme, carefully worked
out at national and local level-
The following discussion outlines the problems involved in regional policy. It is
followed by studies of ltaly, Ireland, France, and Germany.
Genera! introduction
The need for countries in Western Europe to close
the gap between their rich and poor regions is uncon-
troversial. Scratch off the names of a few free market
fundamentalists and there is overwhelming agreement
that governments are right to encourage companies
with taxpayers' money 
- 
cash grants, tax exemptions
and holidays, employment premiums and the like 
- 
not
to invest where they can most easily earn a profit but
in places where too many people are chasing too fewjobs. Yet despite this common purpose and the
creation of an EEC Regional Development Fund,l a
coherent European plan is made difficult by the fact
that areas shaded dark on the map (see insert) by
regional cartographers in Brussels as places needing
special help, defy comparison.
Germany's poorest areas are as wealthy as the
richest of Ireland and ltaly, but a German politician
who cut out regional aids to Lower Saxony or Bavaria
on those grounds would commit political suicide.
Voters in such places do not compare their lot with the
peasants of the Mezzogiorno and deliver up thanks to
the German Chancellor. They judge themselves by
domestic standards against richer areas of Germany,just as a Scottish crofter might look at Londoners and
decide he is worse off The small EEC countries
bordering on Germany are also among the European
elite. Taking 100 as the Community average and using
current exchange rates, the gross domestic product per
head in Denmark last year is estimated at 148, in
Germany l4l, Belgium 120, Luxembourg 120 and
Holland l16. Ireland came at the bottom of the league
table with 50, followed by Italy, and Britain 73.
Even the wealthiest countries claim to have regional
problems. Denmark has poor Danes in Jutland and
Eskimoes on Greenland to care for. A linguistically
I Notr that EBC rc8ioml policy is not just thc dcvcloDmnt fund. Thc EworErn
lnvrsr'.cBt BaDt, thc Soci&l Fund, thc EurcDcan @d and Stel Comuniw aad
GuidsDcc stlon of thc common farm fund arc all aclivclv cnga8cd in rcgionrl
dcvcloDmcnt a! *ll.
torn Belgium has no option but to try to make the
wage paclets of French speakers in Wallonia as fat as
those-of Dutch speakers in Flanders. Holland, the
most densely populated industrial country in the
world, does not want Amsterdam, The Hague and
Rotterdam to become one conurbation. Even
Luxembourg's politicians have taken a stroll around
their state and decided some parts of it need special
help.
This, however, ought not to hide the truth that there
are four, and only four, areas in the EEC in which the
arteries are so hardened that even the strong heartbeat
of a European common market cannot make them
walk without help. These are northern Britain, the
whole of lreland, southern Italy and south-west France.
In Britain declining industries lie at the root of the
problem. Last century's adolescence is this century's
ienility. France's biggest regional problem is Paris.
The French capital has been the master too long,
taking labour and capital from the provinces, and
leaving an empty south-west. Southern Italy contains
parts as unlike as Brittany and the Ruhr, but they are
yoked together by the single shaft ofpoverty a-nd under-
development. Ireland is on the outer edge of the EEC
looking out on 3,000 miles of ocean and all of its
re$ons are poor.
What is surprising is that all this is so uncontrover-
sial, and even iommbnplace. Differences of wealth and
income between social ilasses in Europe are wider than
are the regional differences within countries. Yet
levelling the classes provokes fierce and sometimes
outraget reaction while narrowing the gaps between
regions does not. In all nine countries in the EEC
conventional wisdom says it is better to move jobs to
the people than people to thejobs; that the peaks and
valleys in unemployment rates ought to be landscaped
into a plateau; and that the pattern of population
distribuiion established by the industrial revolution
and other events in the past should remain as little
changed as possible. The reason why arguments to the
contrary have gone by default is largely because the
opposition is bunched in the extreme camp of laissez-
fiiie doctrine, which holds that if areas are allowed to
stagnate, wage rates will eventually become so low and
unernployment so high that industrialists will sniff
profit-in ihe decay and move in with new job-creating
investments.
The sensible argument against regional development
aids is that they depress living standards in general.
Instead of investing, say, in Coventry where it can
make a profit and so pay the taxes which help finance
social services, a company is given public money to go
to Clydeside. The costs are obvious. [n Coventry, this
company would be a normal taxpayer - by keeping it
on the Clyde, it remains dependent on the national
Getting help
To qualify for assistance from the Develop-
ment Fund, a region has first to be designated an
assisted area by national policies; then to have a
gross domestic product per head below the
Community average; and finally to meet one or
more of three specific requirements:
(a) heavy dependence on agricultural employ-
ment;
(b) at least 20 per cent of local employment in
declining industries (defined by the Com-
mission as coal and textiles), accompanied
by chronic unemployment or net outward
migration;
or
(c) a persistently high rate of local unemploy-
ment generally, reaching at least 3'5 per cent
and representing, over a period of years, a
level at least one-fifth above the national
average, or a 10 per cent or more net rate of
outward emigration of the population over a
sustained period.
The Fund may contribute up to 50 per cent of
the national aid expenditure on a given industrial
investment, provided the Fund's contribution
does not exceed 20 per. cent of the investment
value of the project, and up to 30 per cent of
public expenditure on infrastructure. The Com-
mission emphasises that this money is designed to
increase spending on regional development, and
does not mean that national governments can
consequently cut back on their own expenditure.
budget. And the same applies to those workers on the
Clyde the company employs. The money the govern-
ment spends to keep them on the Clyde could be spent
moving those who wish to go to Coventry and building
them better homes there than their Glasgow tenements.
EEC countries have, implicitly at least, rejected the
strategy of moving people to jobs in opting for regional
development aids which aim to stabilise present
patterns of population. Their argument for doing so is
that otherwise the richer regions would become even
more appallingly congested than they are already. The
irony is that through the EEC's agricultural policy
they are committed to a different course. All the Nine
say they recognise it is uneconomic to keep so many
people on the land and so they are supporting farm
incomes at a level which slows down but does not
reverse the drift from rural areas into the towns and
cities. Their intention here is to make the pace of
economic change tolerable, not to defy the change.
Such coherence is lacking in industrial regional
development policies. Countries which accept that the
population ratio between country and town must
change are still committed to the idea that the ratio of
people between northern and southern Britain, or
between northern and southern ltaly, must stay much
the same in the 1980s and the 1990s as it was in the
early 1970s.
That, of course, is an impossible ambition. The
economies of the nine EEC countries are drawing
closer together. They are locked into a wider European
economy which, in raising living standards by promot-
ing intra-European trade in a common market, alsoputs irrelistible strains on population patterns
moulded in the pre-1958 era of more segregated
economies. The growth centre of the EEC is the area
around the Ruhr 
- 
the so-called circle of Lotharingia 
-
and those areas which are farther away from it are at an
increasing disadvantage. Southern ltaly, northern
Britain, Ireland and the south-west of France can
attract industry only so long as lower wages and
continuing government handouts offset the higher
costs ofisolation from the industrial heartland and the
central market. They will slip back as soon as they lose
this competitive edge.
Seen in this way, the kaleidoscope of regional
differences in the EEC can be shaken into a pattern
that makes sense. Governments find the political
strains produced by the powerful magnet at Europe's
centre intolerable. They try to counteract the pull with
regional aid. But, as with support for poor peasants on
their unworkable farms, they cannot, with these
limited means, really do much more than cushion
people against future shock. The small battery of
weapons used for regional strategies may soften the
worst effects ofindustrial decline or social decay, or it
may slow down the steady flow of emigrants. But it
cannot reverse those trends. Governments do not like
to admit this. But unless 
- 
and this is unlikely 
-
regional policy is pursued on a scale and with an
intensity of planning that few of Europe's govern-
ments are ready to contemplate, present frustrations
are likely to grow.
A European dimension
Finding better ways of monitoring how regional aid
is spent is one of the EEC Commission's main tasks now
that there is money in the EEC regional development
fund. The sum (f542 million) is not much to be
disbursed over an experimental period of three years,
but it is a start. The Commission now at least has a
small lever for pushing the Nine's different regional
policies in a European direction. The job of nudging
the Nine out of their present habits is not going to be
easy. None of them, and least of all Britain, want the
EEC to interfere too energetically with their own
systems of regional aid. The money available this year
for regional projects is only a fraction of what Britain
alone is now spending every year on regional aid(about f500 million in 1974). So except to a tiny
country like Ireland, the money the EEC can offer is
unappealing. All the same the Commission can carve
out a role for itself. Deployed with skill its admittedly
limited resources could make the RDF into much more
than a device by which Germany pays the British, the
Italian and the Irish. treasuries to help offset their
current regional aid bills. Burrowing from the other
direction, in the hope their tunnels will meet in the
middle, is the Competition Office2 under its Commis-
sioner, Mr Albert Borschette. The common rules setting
limits for granting regional aid which it is now hammer-
ing out with the Nine under the legal umbrella of
articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty of Rome could be the
EEC's toughest weapon of all.
The EEC Commission's plans for how the RDF is to
be spent have been considerably reshaped since their
first introduction in 1973. Its original map of the
EEC's development regions which were to qualify for
money from the fund covered a third of the Nine's
population and, Greenland included, four-fifths of its
surface area. The Germans rejected the idea of
sprinkling money, as they put it, from a watering can
over so wide an area. Instead, nearly three-quarters of
the new fund will now be concentrated on the neediest
areas of the poorest countries, Italy (which will get 40
per cent), Britain (28 per cent) and lreland (6 per cent).
The EEC fund for modernising backward farms
scatters money through the Nine. The EEC Com-
mission wants to avoid this with the regional fund.
The lesson it drew from studying the Nine's regional
policies was that it is Iikely that random aid damages
more than helps a backward or depressed area. So it
planned to grant EEC regional aid only for projects in
areas where the development authority submitted a
coherent regional growth plan. That was a Iaudable
ambition the Nine should copy. Of the three poorest
countries only Ireland has anything like that at the
moment. Unhappily, the Commission recognises the
Nine may not be ready to swallow this proposal yet.
That will limit the scope of the committee of
regional experts 
- 
drawn from the Nine and the
Commission 
- 
which is to scrutinise requests for aid
from the RDF. All the same, the Commission is far
from ready to operate as a rubber stamp. lt wants to
fix with the Nine criteria for aidable projects which will
push regional policies in new directions. UnderMr Thomson, Commissioner for regional policy,
Brussels regional officials want money concentrated on
industrial projects that create most jobs. Declining
industries, the great beneficiaries of regional aid in
Britain, would get a look in, certainly. But open-
ended support to, say, textile or shipbuilding industries
is likely to destroy more jobs in the Commission's
view than it will save. Backward lreland and Italy
need roads, dams and so on, and, reluctantly, the
Commission is ready to grant aid to infrastructure
projects even though they create fewer jobs than
industrial investment. It wants to discourage invest-
ment in showy automated steel or petrochemical
plants that create only a handful of jobs in the first
place, and little or no secondary employment after-
wards. Rather, it would like investment in the EEC'spoor regions to go to labour-intensive, growth
industries.
If, in all this, the say of Mr George Thomson is as yet
small, the influence of Mr Borschette and his Competi-
tion Office is very large indeed. Under the Treaty of
Rome's competition articles, that office has the last
word on whether a country's state aids distort competi-
2 Thc Competition Offie is conc€rned with restrictivc practiccs, dominantposrlions, rul€s of competition and saat€ aids, all of whiah can distort trade
bctwccn m€mber states
tion or not. If it rules that they do, it can oblige that
country to get rid of them. The influence of Mr Bors-
chette's office on shaping regional policies is seen, as a
result, by many as almost wholly negative. Under
strong pressure from both the Labour and Tory
parties in Britain, the views of the Competition Office
in the Commission about common limits for regional
aid have grown much more pragmatic. And they have
become better at selling what they are doing to
suspicious regional policy-makers, who see them as
legal-minded troublemakers. In its own defence, that
office claims it does not want to stamp out regional
aid, but that it wants to make it much more selective
and efficient.
By sharply restricting the amount of aid govern-
ments can give in rich areas that do not need it, ceilings
No Rubber Stamp
Suspicions that the EEC's regional fund
management committee, which vets the requestsfor money, would simply rubber-stamp the
applications proved wrong when the first
applications were considered. The committee is
filled jointly by Member States and the Commis-
sion. The Germans were particularly careful to
scrutinise a number of large road-building
projects submitted by Italy, Holland, France and
Germany itself. Some of these were postponed
until next time. The Germans have insisted all
along that EEC grants for large infrastructure
projects should be closely tied to the creation of
new industrial jobs and not treated asjust a way
of keeping public spending down.
on regional aid encourage them to concentrate on
areas that need help the most. Wealthier countries
would always be able to afford better inducements to
attract investment than poorer countries 
- 
unless the
Community applies limits to aid in its better-off
regions. That is the theory 
- 
and Mr Borschette's
office's argument. lnevitably, his office is both a
Jekyll and a Hyde. Part of Mr Thomson's task
is now to persuade that office to use its powerful
weapons to improve and not just restrict the Nine's
present policies. But his task is hard. Shared rules
about granting regional aid form a wedge, which the
Commission can use to shape EEC regional policy.
But in shaping that wedge Britain's loud demands for
freedom to decide its own aids have to be appeased.
The rules must not be bent too far. The point of
coordinating regional aids is to discourage pursuit of
regional policies in rivalry. Regional problems are no
Ionger in any true sense national, and so far the
depressing lesson is the failure of governments to cope
with regional imbalances alone. As labour and capital
gravitate naturally to the hub of Europe, the need
grows for shared action to develop the rim. The poor
areas there have to become a shared responsibility.
But a common EEC regional policy is still some way
off in the future.
lreland
Typecast x'ith southern Italy as on underdeveloped outsider, Ireland unmistakably
has geogrophl'against it. Look otrayfrom Europe qnd there is only the Atlantic ocean.
Its economy is backward. Catching up n'ith even its poor industrial partners v'ill be o
slov business. The lrish produce less, tt'ork more on the land, have fex'er.iobs qnd are
reqdier to quit their countrl' ohogelher than any other Europeans save lhe southern
Itqlians. Bul lreland's posilion on the fringe of Europe,for all that, is nol nearlv as bad
as mon)'- including the lrish themselves 
- 
often like to make out.
Historical legacy
Every acre ofthe Irish republic counted as a develop-
ment area under the EEC's original plan for a regional
development fund. That is not surprising. since
Ireland's problem is less to put domestic imbalances
right than to raise the level of the economy as a whole.
An oyster knife could not separate regional planning
in Ireland from its growth policy. Despite the strong
pull of Dublin, Ireland's population of three million is
still spread fairly evenly through the countryside. It has
resources enough for a small population if people and
resources can be properly harnessed.
Yet this advantage is the result of a cruel history
throughout which the lrish emigrated rather than
stayed home to face famine, the English or civil war.
Only 25 years ago it was still argued that the lrish
might be a disappearing people. Ireland is the only
country in the world whose population actually fell in
the first 50 years of this century. At a time when
-lrishmen waited for marriage on average until they
were 35, and when about 40,000 left the island each
year, that statement about the disappearing Irish did
not seem especially outrageous.
There were few jobs to keep them there. The only
industry of note was what the foreign minister,
Mr Garret Fitzgerald, called 'a not very prosperous
food processing sector', and the troubles of Irish
agriculture seemed intractable. Farms were archaic
and investment in agriculture was low. Any improve-
ments were still bitterly connected in farmers' minds
with the higher rents that attempts to modernise
farms had drawn in the past. Unwilling to invest, lrish
farmers stuck to cattle-raising instead of growing crops.
The running wound of emigration in the late 1940s
forced Ireland to rethink its industrial strategy.
Slowly, old hostility to foreign capital was overcome,
as politicians were persuaded of the need to industria-
lise so as to be able to export goods abroad. This
decisive change took place ironically, under the hand
of a revisionist prime minister, Mr Sean Lemass, for,
as minister of industry and commerce in Mr Eamonn
de Valera's government in the 1930s, he had worked
hard to translate the republican slogan of Sinn Fein('ourselves alone' as its critics translate it) into an
industrial policy by discouraging foreign capital. It is
uncertain how much this intensely inward-looking and
protectionist policy really harmed republican Ireland.
There was so little to damage.
In 1949, the Irish Development Authority (lDA) was
established to change all that. Planners at last realised
that in the tiny Irish market, protection behind high
tariffwalls was not enough to call infant industries into
being. The policy now was to lure investors by every
ruse available: tax holidays for export firms setting up
plants in Ireland, cash grants too, and finally, after
1958, a complete end to all restrictions on the foreign
ownership of Irish firms.
The fiercest nationalists still complain that Ireland
was put up for sale. The results are mixed. But
emigration from lreland has now tapered off and
between 1972 and 1974 the country gained more people
than it lost. This strengthens the'push'school in Ireland
which blames high emigration on the frustrations of
life for the young in an old-fashioned country. The
grip of the Catholic church is still strong. The baffiing
entries in the old list of forbidden books raise laughs
(C. S. Forester, Anatole France, Sigmund Freud . . .)
but they mirror an unenlightened school system.
But the 'pull' theory of why the lrish left is not
dead. The Irish quit Ireland, this argument runs, not
because the country is old-fashioned and its economy
weak, but because of the attractions of a job as a
policeman in New York or of the attractions of
downtown Liverpool or Boston. The pull of England
is plain. On the rare occasions when its economy is
doing well, Irish emigration rises sharply.
Growth
But pushed or pulled, the Irish are now readier to
stay in their own country. And they have judged the
recent performance of their economy well. For it grew
faster, admittedly from a lower base, over the last
decade than the British economy. Comparing 1963
with 1972, the lrish real gross national product rose at
an annual rate of 4'02 pel cent, against an annual rate
of growth of 2'5 per cent for Britain. And Ireland now
even seems more prosperous. In the early 1960s
Irishmen in the depressed south-west could easily be
mistaken for Minsk factory workers and Irish women
wore what could more accurately be called frocks than
dresses. The pubs rivalled the labour exchanges in their
seediness and the food offered in restaurants was
worse than England's. That has changed. Pubs have
become lounge bars and both sexes are now more
attractively wrapped. The Irish are proud of this record,
and for all the fears of being taken over by foreign
companies, the incentives they have offered overseas
investors have undoubtedly helped. The lure investors
find most irresistible is the tax-free holiday given up to
1990 on profits earned on exports. The value now to a
businessman of future tax savings, says the Irish
government, corresponds to an initial fixed asset grant
of about 70 per cent. That makes incentives elsewhere
in the EEC look like chicken-feed.
This policy has had immediate results. Capital
investment on grant-aided new industrial projects by
foreigners, from January 1960 to December 1973, is
put at f257 million, and the number of new jobs
created in its wake at over 53,000. Over the same
period, Irish sponsored investment - and this is the
investment the country relied on under the discarded
industrial strategy of the 1930s 
- 
totalled f60'6 million
and created 16,000 new jobs. Americans led the
foreigners by investing f96'5 million, followed by the
British with f48.1 million, the Dutch with f39.2
million and the Germans with f20 million.
The tax holiday for export business is given to firms
setting up anywhere in the country, because lreland
does not want to put potential investors off by telling
them exactly where they should invest. But even in so
underpopulated a country as lreland 
- 
its density of
population is the lowest in Europe 
- 
regional planners
are still worried by overcrowding in the east. This is a
big problem for the tDA and it will get bigger, as the
economy grows; but the planners have the advantage
of a fairly clean slate.
Although all of Ireland counts as a development
area, some regions are worse off than others. The west
fifth of the total, are now Dubliners. Fear of congestion
in the capital may lead regional planners into mis-
takenly underselling the attractions of Dublin, and
frighten investors away altogether, although so far that
has not happened. And holding back Dublin is
popular with the Irish people. The dangers are,
however, plain. For Ireland outside Dublin is still a
Iand of villages and farms. A quarter of the labour
force of just over one million is still to be found in
agriculture. Cork, Ireland's second city, is a fifth of the
size of Dublin, and the only other towns of conse-
quence are Galway, Limerick and Waterford. The
roads inland are better suited to the age ofthejaunting
car, though for the tourist they are gloriously free of
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is poorer and more dependent on farmingthan theeast.In 1969, the average personal income per head at
current prices in the east (around Dublin) was f517,
in the west f324,in the north-west f3l6 and in Donegal
only €305. For a country inside the EEC these are
staggeringly low incomes, and it is not surprising that
the highest rates of emigration are to be found in the
west of Ireland as well. From 1956 to 1971, as a yearly
average, the net lciss of people from Dublin and the
east was less than one in a thousand while ten in a
thousand left the north-western region and just over
ten in a thousand left the west.
Keeping Dublin fair
So another thrust of IDA's thinking is to discourage
too much investment around Dublin and to encourage
it in the rest ofthe country instead. The city ofJoyce is
not a big town by modern staqdards; but, all the
same, 650,000 of the Irish in the republic, or over a
traflic. AII these things make investors hesitate before
Ieaving the relatively familiar surroundings of Dublin.
Given the twin goals of wanting to build up the
countryside at Dublin's expense, without shooing
investment away, it is not surprising that Ireland's
development programme has followed a zig-zag path.
Planning problems
The planners dilemma is hard. If the growth of
Dublin is to be checked, the natural corollary is to
strengthen the secondary towns, in imitation of
France's metropoles d'equilibre. But when Professor
Colin Buchanan was asked by the Irish government in
1968 to apply his town-planner's eye to Ireland's
future, the response to his proposals was ferocious. He
recommended I I or so 'growth centres' to act as
counterweights to Dublin, with Limerick and Cork as
the biggest. But, as in other countries where planners
have tried to foist the growth point idea on to unsus-
pecting authorities, every small village wanted to be
made the focus of roaring new industries. Not so much
because the villages wanted smoking chimneys to
blacken their 'gentle rain', but because no village
wanted to be left out. The Irish read the Buchanan
report as recommending the principle of moving
'people to the jobs', while what voters really wanted
was the principle of Jobs to the people', the slogan
adopted by the IDA.
The Buchanan report fast became a political
albatross as a result, although Ireland's regional
planners tried to rescue many of its ideas. For if
voters hated Buchanan, economists and industrialists
liked it. Firms would move out into poorer regions,
they thought, if the towns were modernised and the
roads and communications improved. It is the business
now of the sure-footed chief of the IDA, Mr Michael
Killeen, to slip many of Buchanan's ideas through the
backdoor while smoothing local jealousies. Some of
the targets in the IDA's latest five year plan for 1973-77
look a little battered now by oil prices and recession
and will be revised accordingly. But the planners still
defend the soundness of the basic theme that to slow
the growth of Dublin, industry has to be enticed both
to big towns with some industry already (like Cork,
Limerick or Waterford) and to remote areas which are
still losing people fast.
This looks contradictory, but asking quite blatantly
to have it both ways, as the Irish planners do, may just
be right. The IDA uses regional targets for the
creation of new jobs (as the map shows) as a fine
gauge for judging just how well not only whole regions
but even single towns are doing. Had Italy monitored
the huge investments in the Mezzogiorno like that, the
failure to create jobs might have been recognised much
earlier. There is supposed to be a snag with crisp newjob targets, for they can raise expectations which are
almost bound to be disappointed. Yet experience so
far has shown that the IDA's targets may have been
too low, not too high. By lune 1974, the south-
eastern region had already attracted enough investment
to get well beyond its 1977 job target. Waterford, its
capital, is, in addition to Belfast and Dublin, one of the
three Irish ports providing a sea corridor to the
continent. For many importers selling in Europe, it is
the nearest port of entry to the giant and crowded
Rotterdam. The soil in the area is good, which
promises well for farming, and it already has a few well-
entrenched if small industries, the most well-known
being Waterford glass.
But other towns less well endowed than Waterford,
let alone Dublin, did well too. Donegal hit the three-
quarter mark on its job target last June and even
regions on the far western edge of Europe all reached
between half and two-thirds. The laggard which
worries the IDA is the north-east on the border with
Northern Ireland. Dundalk, once a prosperous town,
has fallen on hard times. The whole area is, of course, a
casualty of the disturbances in the north.
lgnoring the bombs
The IDA has stopped bothering to buy advertising
that proclaims the attractions of investing and living in
a quiet rural country. With pictures of bomb victims
from the north on the television almost each night,
there is no point in that sort of selling. The IDA now
prefers to get businessmen to come to lreland and to
show them around. And companies have come and
shown that they are ready to invest in the remotest
places. The two most striking are a Snia Vescosa
textile investment in Sligo, which should provide
1,000 new jobs, and a Courtaulds investment in
Letterkenny, Donegal, promising 1,800 new jobs.
The attractions ofinvesting even in rural Ireland are
not hard to understand for big foreign investors who
can use Ireland as a base for exports. Irish wage rates
are low by EEC standards, and Ireland offers a tariff-
free door to the huge EEC market. The flow is so far
small, but it is rising quickly. Irish exports to Britain
fell from 70.2per cent to 54.6 per cent oftotal exports
from 1965 to 1973, while in the same period, its
exports to the other EEC countries rose from l2'7 per
cent to 2l'3 per cent.
Irish planners are not worried about what happens
when the tax holidays run out in 1990. They are not
frightened that foreign investors will suddenly get up
and leave, for tax holidays can always be extended.
They are concerned, however, that many of lreland's
new industries, like southern Italy's, are not creating
secondary industries around them. An antique county
system, bequeathed by the British, with its 87 separate
Iocal planning authorities is no help in providing a
rational economic plan for a small country with a
population Iess than half the size of Paris's. And giving
Ireland over to foreigners, as many see the present
policy to be, creates problems. The oil spill in Bantry
Bay last year led to calls on the government to be less
passive towards foreign companies. Yet for all the
complaints, the prevailing attitude for the time being is
that Ireland has little choice but to rely on foreigners,
to help them industrialise and to absorb 
- 
on Irish
soil 
- 
the 10,000 people that leave jobs on the land
each year.
Italy
-The division of ltaly into north and south is still the sharpest in Europe, but changesin the south are beginning very slowly to blur the dffirenies. A few short years iith
mone-y in their pockets have helped the southerners in cities to erqse that look of back-
wardness that once marked them out from northerners, rich and poor alike. Cotnsumer
spending in the south has almost trebled in real terms over the lait 25 years, and this is
now audibly apparent on the streets of southern towns, with the noise of platfurm-heels
and midday traffic jams. For the south is no longer a land of peasaiti. The number
tilling the land tumbled by just under a half between l95l and 1971. More and more
southerners crou'd the cities, and not just those in northern Italy or in Germany but in
the south as well. The Mezzogiorno during those two decades losifour million iniabitants
in emigration. Since 197 I thatflow has slowed down. Just as dramatically, the south's
shay of the nation's investment, always low, rose over the period I95l-lgzl from just
under a quarter to a third of the total.
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno 
-
Fund for the South
Until 1951, the Mezzogiorno had a name, but no
proper legal status. It got that with the establishment
of a development fund for the south 
- 
the Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno 
- 
whose northern spending limit marks
Italy's modern Mason-Dixon line. Even then the
south was not uniformly poor. Puglia, which forms the
heel of Italy, and Campania, surrounding Naples
boasted some industry, and incomes in these old
provinces were higher than in Calabria, Basilicata or
Sardinia. But for all these differences the south as a
whole lagged well behind the north. About 37 per cent
of the Italian population lived there (1951) but the
south produced a mere 22 per cent of the nation's
wealth. .The resources of the Mezzogiorno were so
badly harnessed that the people living there could not
support themselves. They lived off what workers who
had gone north sent back home, on subsidies and on
the public payroll. The south had no capital funds,
little industry and small, inefficient farms.
Despite some signs of progress, the south today has
not really changed. It is still a subsidised economy. It
does not produce enough. Its share ofpopulation-and
of production is almost exactly what it was in 1951,
and despite thousands of billions of lire spent in the
south on heavy industry by the state, the number ofjobs has fallen. The apparent jump in 'industrial
investment' cannot hide the fact that much of this
capital has gone into speculative building. Industrialjobs, loosely defined, have risen by 43 pei cent, but a
goo4 many of these jobs are in construction. Nearly
half the south's workers are in service trades and
public administration.
city, many times larger than London or Paris. But
once yoked to energetic Piedmont the south rapidly
Iost ground to the north. Its industries were stunted.
Locked behind a high tariff wall, its exports were
ruined. Unable to manipulate its own terms of trade,it had to accept a flood of high cost imports from
northern Italy.
The gap between the industrial north and agricul-
tural south widened under Mussolini, who reserved for
tbe Mezzogiorno a leading role in his 'battle of grain'.
Southerners, who might have flocked north for jobs,
were obliged to stay on the land in order to make Italy
self-sufficient in wheat. In itself, the aim was right: if
the south could not be industrialised for lack of markets
and capital, at least its farms should be brought up to
date. The fascists did drain the Pontine marshes south
of Rome. But at the end of the second world war, the
Mezzogiorno's farms were still appallingly backward, a
patchwork of huge unirrigated holdings, or tiny
unworkable plots. Real incomes in the poorest areas of
the Mezzogiorno, Calabria and Basilicata, were a
third of those in Lombardy, Piedmont and Liguria.
The south lacked basic amenities that the north had
long enjoyed, Iike modern roads and telephones. An
enclosed and inward-looking social fabric mirrored
this economic neglect.
The setting up, in 1950, ofa state fund for the south,
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, was the government's
first serious attempt ever to close the gap. Despite the
callow state of development economics, it had three
things operating in its favour: money; freedom to
spend it; and the tacit assurance there would be more
money in the future. The first lO-year credit of 060
million a year was a huge amount for the times; the
Cassa was independent of the ministries; and more
money was guaranteed for the time when the initial
funding ran out. The Cassa was refunded in 1960 and
then again in 1965 for 15 years.
The Cassa's priorities were upgrading farms and
giving the south a basic infrastructure. Northern
industry at that time had not yet started its export
boom. So, tugging to get the south's scattered manu-
facturing sector off the ground then seemed a waste of
money. The Cassa is criticised for concentrating, like
Mussolini, on 'propaganda works' in the south. That
may be true, but in the next two decades it did, through
the state holding company, IRI, and other agencies,
build 18,000 miles of road, 'sewing up the boot' with
autostradas, as Cavour had wrongly predicted the
railways would do a century earlier. It also added to
the dry southern landscape 1,500 miles of dykes,
8,400 miles of canals and 7,500 miles of aqueducts.
History
The origins of the south's backwardness are deep
and tangled. Causes for it have been sought, not
altogether convincingly, in the Mezzogiorno's position
a!4 climate. It was, it was said, too dry io farm
efficiently and too-far from the north foi fledgling
industries to profit from its rich markets. Again, it-wai
said, the south has produced no entrepreneurs, and
Mediterranean workers are, it is added with a depre-
catory shrug, lazy. But before unification in 1861,-the
Bourbon kingdom of the Two Sicilies boasted a stakein tipbuilding, textiles and railway engines. TheMediterranean's first steamboat was-launihed from
Naples in 1818. Indeed only 300 years earlier than
that, Naples was by far Europe'd largest and richest
Roads appeared in, and water flowed, to towns with
political putt in the capital. There was little or no
irlanning behind the spending. One village would get_a
dam, bu1 no canal ; another a canal, and no dam. No
hint of scandal has touched the office of the Cassa
itself in its years under the sure hand of Sr Gabriele
Pescatore, i tough Avellino lawyer, 'with friends
through 360 degrees'. But Cassa money has been a
rich source in the south for the game of sottogoverno,
oone shoe before the vote, another one afterwards'.
Both Christian Democrats and Socialists (who in 1964,
like the Communists now, returned to dealing with the
system, instead of overturning it) have made lavish
use of this patronage, swapping aqueducts for votes'
Another serious criticism of the Cassa is that the
huge quantities of money spent in the south failed to
produie what was needed most jobs. In the first
decade less than a quarter of the Cassa's money went
to industry. Dams were built with earthmovers brought
down from the north. The new autostrada simply
speeded trucks bringing Milan's or Turin's goods
south. The exodus from the land continued, crowding
the cities, and the 'miracle' of the export boom in the
north only caused the south to lag even further behind.
In the laie 1950s the Cassa stopped to rethink, and
came to the conclusion the south had to undergo a
shock industrialisation if the gap was ever to be closed.
The Cassa then devised a twin strategy to achieve this.
New start
New incentives were created to lure industriai
investment to the south. The most attractive of these
were tax holidays and subsidised loan rates. At the
same time, the map of the south was spotted with over
40 growth areas (shown on the accompanying map),
where new industries would act, hopefully, as'poles of
attraction' to new firms, new investment and new jobs.
It was a bold scheme. The northern boom had already
faltered, and businessmen there, so it was argued,
facing bottlenecks and higher wages caused by rapid
expansion in cramped zones around Milan and Turin,
were looking for new outlets.
But private industry refused to be enticed. Instead,
the huge state enterprises, Italsider in steel and ENI in
oil and petrochemicals, were persuaded by the govern-
ment to invest in new plants in the south. These giants
came. It made little difference to Italsider whether its
new plant was located north or south, apart from the
heavy cost of bringing down skilled labour from the
north, but the tax concessions and otJrer incentives
compensated for that. The site chosen for its fourth
steel works was in Puglia at Taranto, whose only
industry up till then had been the shipyards making
motor torpedo boats for the Italian navy. Construc-
tion began in 1960. The site was good, Taranto being a
port, close to north African sources of ore. Finished in
1965, the plant was producing 5'4 million tons of steel
a year (over half Italsider's total) in 1973 and employ-
ing over 17,000 men. The same pattern was repeated
when ENI built a refinery at Gela on the southern
coast of Sicily, and a chemical plant near Sassari in
northern Sardinia. It did not much matter that many
of these vast plants would collapse under their own
weight without government support and subsidies.
What mattered was that they did almost nothing to
help the Mezzogiorno. For the hoped-for'herbaceous
border' of secondary and ancillary industries never
sprouted after the giant plants came into production.
The motor manufacturers paid the extra transport
cost of Taranto steel rather than moving some of their
plants south, and the downstream plastics industries
that were meant to flow from the construction of the
refineries never materialised. Not surprisingly, these
barren investments of the 1960s quickly won the name
of'cathedrals in the desert'.
lndustrial Gothic
The latest desert cathedral is a vast synthetic-
textile plant near Ottana in central Sardinia. Its master
builders are the publicly-owned ANIC and the private
company, Montedison. Planned in 1970, it is hoped
eventually to providejobs for over 7,000 ex-shepherds
from the surrounding countryside. [t is a bold plan.
The plant uses the latest technology bought from
Japan. It is one of flve ogglomerati planned for
Sardinia, to balance the chemical plants near Sassari in
the north and Cagliari in the south. It amply illustrates
the disadvantages as well as the advantages of
parachuting heavy industry into a peasant landscape.
Sheep graze by the perimeter fence, safely so far. If
the growth strategy works, other industries will
displace these flocks. But first, roads must be built.
The route to the port of Oristano which supplied the
building of the plant with raw materials and where
eventually its products will flow is still gravel for
several miles at a stretch. Labour disputes delayed the
plant's completion. It is still not working to full
capacity, because supplies of water to run a plant that
size are not available. The skeleton workforce in the
plant resists nightshift and Sunday working; but
overtime is needed to run the plant efficiently. Workers
are recruited from a pool of 20,000 families unused to
industrial disciplines. They live in 5l villages which
will be one hour's driving time from the plant, once
roads are built. ANIC and Montedison do not disguise
what is anaesthetically termed 'the lack of social
infrastructure'. The nearest big hospitals are at
Sassari and Cagliari, over 90 minutes drive away.
Planned housing has not been built. Public transport is
poor. Despite these drawbacks, work in the plant is a
privilege for those who get it. Wages, which average
3'6 million lire a year within the plant, are higher than
anything local peasants have ever known. This
bitterly divides Iocal families who are allowed to offer
no more than one worker to the plant. Older workers
helped build the plant, but cannot now work in it. The
management talks airily of cultural adjustment in the
area taking five years.
At the planning stage, before 1970, both ENI, which
owns ANIC, and Montecatini, which became Monte-
dison, were against the Ottana site. Committed as ENI
was by public law to invest 80 per cent of its capital
spending in the south, the project strained even its
tolerant decision-takers. The capital invested would, it
was then estimated, take 20 years to pay off. The spin-
off into smaller industries would take ten years at
Ieast, and few believed that this optimistic target
would be hit. The plant was finally built only after the
Cassa and the Sardinian regional government agreed
to provide 40 per cent of the initial investment funds.
Defenders of the project say the pay-offs that
balance these obvious faults are in the future. But the
record of earlier cathedrals in the desert is not good.
There are now signs, however, that the failure of the
strategy that has dominated Rome's thinking about
the Mezzogiorno since the early 1960s is at last being
recognised. Despite $2'2 billion into heavy engineering,
and another $2'Z bittion into other industries and
despite loans from the European Investment Bank and
larfe foreign investments, bnly about 130,000 addi-
tional jobi have been added to the Mezzogiorno's
industrial payroll. And nearly 400,000 jobs have
disappeared in farming. So the number of jobs
available in the south has actually fallen. No wonder
people ask bitterly whether the Cassa should be given
new billions of lire to destroy more jobs.
Change is hard
Reform is slow in coming. In the last attempt to turn
the government's southern strategy around, the left-
wing Christian Democrats, led by Sr Carlo Donat-
Cattin, who was briefly minister for the Mezzogiorno a
year ago, failed to break the hold of the Cassa and the
interests that are now entrenched around it. And the
difficulties of his predecessor, Sr Giacomo Mancini, a
left-wing socialist and native of Calabria, show how
hard it is for a government to replace a bad system of
state subsidy with a better one, once people are used to
the old. When neglected Calpbrians rioted in 1971, the
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government showered them with promises of jobs and
investment plans, including a new steel works at
Gioia Taura, 30 miles nortli of Reggio, which, it was
reckoned, would create at least 10,000 new jobs. A
deep water port would be needed. IRI, it was said,
would supply it. Then somebody did the sums. Eachjob would cost about 100 million lire. The pacifier was
too expensive for Sr Mancini, who offered the Cala-
brians 13,000 jobs in smaller industries if they would
give up that particular 'cathedral'. The regional
government and the trade unions both rejected his
offer, and plans for the plant are still alive, if not
exactly kicking.
The shake-up hoped for by Sr Donat-Cattin
involved three basic reforms. The first was to make
payment of incentives automatic so as to get them out
of politics. Everyone has at least one story about
businessmen not receiving their grants until they had
tipped the right amount into party coffers. The red
tape is tangled, and corruption widespread.
The second idea was to follow Britain into subsidis-
ing labour costs directly, with something like a regional
employment premium. The major criticism of all
earlier incentives was that they discriminated in
favour of capital intensive industries, even though th"
grants and tax holidays were scaled in favour c
smaller firms and even though the heavy social security
costs borne by Italian employers were cut for southern
investors. Now that contract wage levels between the
north and the south are more or less equal, this subsidy
makes a small difference to the potential investor's
wage bill, but this is apparently not enough because so
far it has attracted few potential employers. Manu-
facturing investment in the Mezzogiorno is still 40 per
cent of that in the north. So Sr Donat-Cattin proposed
a falling l0 year employment premium, worth $1,@0 a
worker in a new job for five years and then $700 for
the next five.
The third and most provocative reform he suggested
was that the Cassa should be split up and its best men
sent to work with the new regional govbrnments, so as
to remedy the past lack of planning. 'All the Cassa
ever does is pay the bills', said one of his aides, and by
putting the spenders on the spot, the hope was to give
both the regions and central government better value
for money. These suggested reforms are still being
debated and whether the new Italian government will
follow them up is not clear. But if they or something
like them were to be implemented, the Cassa would be
released to do the kind of heavy jobs it should have
been doing all along: bringing water to southern farms,
reafforestation and so on.
Farming failure
The collapse of southern farming is as bad as the
failure of industry. The real cost in lost opportunities
and in having the most backward farms among the
Nine is a huge burden on the whole of ltaly, which ran
up a trade deficit of over $2 billion on food alone last
year. About a million and a half people still work on
the land in the Mezzogiorno, but barely more than one
per cent of its plots, in early 1971, reached the minimum
turnover of l2'5 million lire fixed by the EEC common
farm policy as the guideline for a workable farm.
The state of farming now seems all the worse
because Italy's future in farming inside the EEC once
seemed so bright. The plan was for southern Italy to
supply northern Europe with its Mediterranean
produce, for seasonal differences made ltaly's goods
A problem of Water
In northern Italy 3l per cent of the land or
2'3 million hectares are irrigated. In the south as
little as 7'4 per cent or 718,000 hectares are
irrigated. It is reckoned that irrigation gives an
average annual added value of some L500,000
per hectare. Even in spite of this neglect and the
continuing exodus from the countryside, agricul-
ture in the south still accounts for something like
40 per cent of national production.
competitive despite higher costs. But the south lacked
the ca'pital and the businessmen to make the right
investment in freezing, packing and transport. And
Italy steadily lost ground to its neighbours outside the
EEC, such as Spain and Greece.
Ironically, the land reform carried out at huge
expense from Cassa money in the early 1950s is partly
to blame. After the liberation, occupation of the land
by peasants swept the south and quickly got commu-
nist support. An uneasy truce held until 1948, and with
the communists and socialists out of government, the
Christian Democrats pushed through their own land
reform. By the time it was completed in 1962,85,000
families had bought small plots of up to l0 acres at
low mortgage rates. But by the early 1960s, many
farms had been abandoned. It is no good a peasant
owning his own land if there is no water to irrigate it.
Nobody knows precisely how many of the south's
farms have had to be abandoned for lack of water, but
in the wild countryside in Basilicata around Potenza
the loss of farming land to erosion goes on day by day.
Southern farming needs rescuing before it is too late.
A Cassa shorn of huge industrial ambitions should
spend money on dams and afforestation. From five
rivers in rainy Basilicata alone it is reckoned that two
and a half million cubic meters of water run to waste
into the sea each year. That should be harnessed. But
such an effort needs time and continued attention.
Equally urgent is reform of the ramshackle and often
corrupt marketing of food in the south. Prices in the
food shops in Naples are often l0 per cent higher thanin Milan, chiefly because of bad transport and
racketeering.
Sunlit squalor
The traditional safety valve for pressures in the
south was emigration in search of work elsewhere. For
the moment, that is blocked because unemployment is
rising all over Europe. The current fear is that some of
the four million southerners who left will return from
Germany and the north. That could be the signal for
the overcrowded cities of the south, like Naples or
Palermo, to burst out in protest against their condition
as Reggio Calabria did four years ago. 'Naples will
explode', is the fatalistic judgment of many Neapoli-
tans. The statistics make optimism look foolish.
Crowded against the bay, one and a quarter million
Neapolitans live in the city itself; and another two and
three-quarter million live in the suburbs that sprawl
out through the hills into Campania. Employment
figures are imprecise, but of these four million people,
only half are described as 'active'. And of those two
million, one-third have jobs, one-third work part-time,
and one-third are registered as unemployed. In Naples
itsell this means that a workforce of between 200,000
and 400,000 people supports a population three to six
times as large. Many part-time workers are women,
doing'take-out' work (which allows their employers to
get round minimum wage regulations). Absenteeism in
industry is high. Next door to Mobil's refinery in the
north-east of the city are long rows of broken green-
houses, where workers will take two days off to tend
their vegetables. Central Naples is the most densely
crowded city in Europe. Housing is scarce. Infant
mortality is the highest in ltaly, yet the birth rate is
among the highest too. In this environment, talk of
attracting industry with investment incentives sounds
unreal, but Naples cannot just be ignored. In and
around the city lives one-fifth ofthe population ofthe
Mezzogiorno, which needs to be supported somehow.
Naples does have industry: the Italsider steel works,
the Mobil refinery, as well as shipyards, electrical and
chemical plants. There are cars now too. But those
industries are moving out, under pressure from
environmental lobbies. Instead of adding to its steel
plant inside Naples, Italsider will build a new one in
the Volturno valley, 20 miles to the north, and four of
the city's other industrial plants will follow. Naples has
few industrial jobs, and this will uproot three-quarters
l0
of the city's industrial work-force. The unions, at first,
were against this move, rightly frightened about losing
the few jobs there are. But Italsider says the move out
of the city will eventually create more jobs, because
Naples is already too congested for the existing plants
to survive. It is better to make a planned move now,
the argument goes, than to wait for Naples's industries
to be choked slowly to death. The snag is that no one
yet has suggested how to replace the missing pay-
packets caused by the exodus of industry.
The South's share
There is every sign that private industry in the north
is readier now than it used to be to consider investing
in the south 
- 
once, that is, it is again ready to invest at
all. Four-fifths of state enterprise investment must now
go south by law, but for years private investors fought
shy of imitating the boss of Olivetti Sr Adriano
Olivetti, who moved south and who managed, it is
said, to make life so pleasant for his workers at the
Olivetti office equipment plant at Bagnoli, near Naples,
that there were a hundredfold more applications than
there were jobs and tourists stopped frequently at the
plant to ask for rooms. For, despite the investment
incentives, investors are worried about poor transport,
the lack of telephones and the shortage of skilled
labour.
Under strong pressure from the unions and the
government, Fiat will in future add to its handful of
plants in the south instead of expanding near Turin.
Wages are now equalised in the north and south, but
businessmen still hope that strikes and absenteeism
will be lower in the south.
The future
The Mezzogiorno's problems will not be over even
if more medium and small manufacturing plants are
established there. It grew rapidly in the decade 196l-71,
and though most manufacturing in the south is still in
declining industries the fastest growth is in newer
industries. But these are bunched either around Bari,
in the province of Puglia, which has always been a
little richer than the rest of the south, or in the valleys
between Rome and Naples. Firms are ready to invest
there because they are near two large cities. But will
Calabria, Sicily or Sardinia ever get the investment
they need?
When mulling over the future of the Mezzogiorno,
Italians like, in rare moments of optimism, to say that
southern Italy is now no longer on the edge ofthings:
thrust into the Mediterranean, the south, they argue, is
poised to become a supplier for swelling markets in the
Middle East. At the moment that is not much more
than sales talk to soften the resistance of investors to
the Mezzogiorno. But Mediterranean trade is moving
out of the jet fighter and dried fruit stage, and geo-
graphically, if not economically, southern Italy is in
the right place to take its share.
France
The word provincial is nowhere so insulting as on the lips of a Parisian. France's
capital outshone the provinces long before Napoleon split them into 90 odd departments
and today no other capital in Europe holds quite such sway over its country. Money,
business, government, politics, art, newspapers 
- 
wherever one looks, Paris is the
masrer. Yet the capital has taken labour and resources from the provinces for too long.
Its former strengths are now weaknesses. Overcrowded Paris is France's major problem
region. One Frenchman infive lives in the Paris area, in spite of the fact that France is a
rich country with a vast, dangerously underpopulated south-west. French regional
thinking has alw,ays focused on how to redress this lack of balance.
Away from Paris
The dangers of the Paris magnet were foreseen
clearly as long ago as 1947 by a young French
geographer M. Jean-Francoi's Gravier. The title of his
book, 'Paris et le desert frangais', was a warning of
what would happen to France if the rush to Paris from
the land and from the old coal and textile towns of the
north-east was not checked: the west's resources
would be wasted and congestion in Paris would lead to
ever higher costs and inefficiency. At that time, the
farms were losing 100,000 to 150,000 workers every
year and France west of the line linking Le Havre with
Marseilles had 37 per cent of the population living in
56 per cent of the country. Few missed the book's
underlying political message: if the right in France
holds the country-side and the left holds the towns,
what happens when everybody lives in Paris? It is no
accident that the greatest enthusiasts for aminage-
ment du territoire 
- 
an untranslatable term for regional
planning in the broadest sense 
- 
were the Gaullists,
who quickly saw the need for special economic support
for their vast constituency outside the big cities.
Decentralisation became a corner stone of economic
policy in the early 1960s as the government set about
trying to inject new investment into stagnant regions
and to ease the pressure on Paris. Characteristically,
these efforts were directed firmly from the centre, by a
small but crack staff of civil servants in an inter-
ministerial department set up in 1963 called Dildgation
d l'aminagement du territoire et d I'action rdgionale
(Datar). Its present head, M. Jerome Monod, is out of
favour with M. Giscard d'Estaing, who blames Datar
for letting Les Halles be knocked down and for the now
halted motorway on the left bank. But Datar's power
is still enormous. Supervised at one time by the late
President Pompidou and M. Oliver Guichard and now
by M. Poniatowski, the minister of the interior, Datar
is normally the responsibility of the strong-man in any
French administration.
Datar's power
Datar's power comes not from having lots of money
to spend but from its ability to say no, both to
companies and to local officials, and the authority to
back what it says. The vaunted regional reform of 1972
which was meant to give more power to local author-
ities was really window-dressing. They have to wait,
as they have always done, on the word from Paris. In
'The Red and Black', Stendahl pokes fun at the poor
mayor of Verridres who needed three trips to Paris for
approval to build a wall in his town. Local authorities
have advanced a little farther since 1830, but the
regions still have to come to Paris for money and their
budgets are drawn up in Paris under the eye of Datar
officials.
French incentives for attracting investment into the
regions are among the least generous in Europe and the
conditions for firms getting grants are tough. A mixture
of these incentives and Datar's vigorous interference
with business planning decisions has helped slow the
growth of Paris down in recent years and push new
industries into the provinces. The highest cash grants
for setting up in one of the development areas (as
shown on the map) go only to industrial firms which
put in new plants or expand old ones. Investors have
three years to complete projects and the grants are far
from automatic. On investments of less than Fr. 5m,
the nod may be given by regional prefects (probably a
Parisian anyway) but if the sum is over Fr. 5m the
decision goes to the ministry of finance. The grant
used to be tied to the condition that the project should
create at least 30 jobs, but last year this was relaxed,
to make the incentives a little more enticing.
Paris, like Rome, has not hesitated to push state-
owned companies into areas where jobs are needed,
but unlike the money poured south in Italy, some
attempt has been made to build up centres of
specialisation, by grouping telecommunications in
Brittany, by adding to the aeronautic industry
Toulouse (now something of a disaster area as a
result), or to electronics in Grenoble. A tradition of
central planning in France, of course, makes trying to
get industry more evenly distributed much easier. And
geography helps. Unlike Britain or Italy, which are
awkwardly long, France offers its regional planners a
five sided chequerboard on which to plot an orderly
future. In the 1960s, when regional planningin France
took on the pretensions of a science, a grand scheme
was adopted to build up seven 'metropoles d'6quilibre'
as counierweights to Paris. At the same time, the
rapid economic growth of Paris was to be channelled
in a great arc west towards Brittany. French planners
from Baron Haussmann onwards have always been
attracted to grandiose visions of this kind. In fact
planning had little to do with the growth of these seven
urban areas spread evenly through France. They all
grew so fast under their own steam during the 1960s,
when all France was getting rich, that there was a fear
that some of them, like Paris, would get out of control.In 1971, Datar began to concentrate instead on
building up France's 200 odd middle-size towns with
less than 200,000 people apiece.
The taste for sweeping plans is evident in the vast
and, some say, struggling industrial complex at Fos,
which formed, witti vtarseilles, one of the original
'metropoles d'6quilibre'. The marsh and scrubland
site fof France's second coastal steelworks (the first is
at Dunkirk), with new refineries and a deep water
tanker terminal, Fos is meant to be the base of a huge
new industrial axis, running north up to Lyons, and
out toward$ Spain along the coast. If the hopes for
growth in Mediterranean markets are well-founded,
then the south of France should grow rich.
Avoiding Alphaville
France's regional thinkers are now looking beyond
the location of manufacturing industry towards a
better distribution of service trades and facilities
throughout the country. Counteracting the pull of
Paris on the service sector of the French economl' will
become increasingly important in future. That sector
already accounts for over ten million jobs in France,
or about half the labour force. And it is expected to
grow at nearly three times the pace of manufacturing
industry. Over 850,000 Parisians work in offices
(another one and a quarter million work in caf6s,
shops and other service trades). The attractions ofcity
life make their employers reluctant to move, despite
government pleas. In the two years up to 1970 only 19
requests were filed for grants by Paris offices taking a
plunge into the provinces, while the government got a
hundred times as many requests from industrial firms
for relocation grants to move out of the capital.
Paris cannot be allowed, it is sensibly argued, to
look any more like Godard's Alphaville than it does
ilready. Millions of cubic metres of office building
have been added to the Paris skyline in the last two
decades. It was realised a little late in the day that the
complex incentives designed to persuade large offices
to quit Paris did little or nothing to stop these develop-
ments. In l97l stern controls were imposed, and now
one in every three building applications is being
turned down.
This tougher policy of decentralisation would be
seen to be working, it is said, if a large bank could be
persuaded to move the administrative tail of its head
office out of the capital. Paris's monopoly of finance
is frequently cited as one of the main reasons that
companies like to keep of their head offices near the
city limits (the family firms of Michelin at Clermont-
Ferrand and the Berliet truck-makers in Lyons being
among the exceptions to this rule).
French banks have so far proved unbudgeable, but
the government can now claim some modest successes.
Under pressure Credit Lyonnais transferred its
computer division to Aix-en-Provence and Soci6t6
Gdn6rale moved its bond servicing department to
Nantes. Banque Nationale de Paris has switched its
portfolio division to Toulouse and the pension
department of the Caisse des Depots is now in
Bordeaux. These are laudable moves, but they
represent only tiny steps towards the government's
goal of making France's second largest town, Lyons,
a banking centre in its own right.
Fields of force
For all the emphasis on 'equilibrium', the attention
of the French Government and of investors has
tended to focus less on poor regions than on those that
are already well-developed. Brittany and the south-
west are still relatively neglected. That perhaps is not
surprising since these contain some of the poorest
farming areas. If concentration on the problems of
Paris tends to make people forget them, the long
summer of farm riots last year was a sharp reminder
that even in 1975 France still has an agrarian problem,
despite a loss from the land, over the past 20 years, of
140 people a day. Between 1955 and 1970 over
50,000 farm-holdings were given up, leaving an
ageing workforce on the land.
France's farms make a healthy contribution to the
country's exports. But much of it is grain and sugar
from the rich Paris basin. Farms in Brittany and the
south-west 
- 
apart from the winegrowers around
Bordeaux 
- 
are chiefly poor livestock producers, with
too few beasts to make money even in good years. In
1967, Paris launched a plan to help the dying farm
regions of Brittany/Manche, Limousin/Lot, the
Auvergne, Aveyron and Lozdre. The aim is to end
their isolation by putting in schools, better roads and
by helping farmers to modernise their farms. The snag
is the clash of goals between supporting peasants on
the land and improving agriculture. At a high cost to
consumers France has, in practice, eased the lot of
its poor farmers by keeping prices up, with much of
the support cost being borne by Brussels. That may
not make much economic sense, but it has made the
decline.of the small farmer in France slower and far
less disruptive than it would otherwise have been.
France's regional policies can claim modest success
at slowing Paris's growth down but they have not
helped the poorer regions that much. Between 1950
and 1971, the Beaujeu-Garnier report on Paris
estimates that about 500,000 new jobs were created in
the regions as a result of decentralisation policies. But
about two-thirds of these jobs and three-quarters of
the firms which created them were within 175 miles of
Paris, and Brittany and the south-west remained
underdeveloped. The failure ofindustry and the service
trades to spread through the provinces is due, in part,
to the field of force created by the huge Paris market
and, in part to the reluctance of investors to set up in
regions where the roads are poor and the telephone
service worse than in Paris. (Over 600,000 subscribers
are on the waiting list for telephones in France, it was
reckoned recently, and another two and a half million
would apply for a telephone if they thought there was
even a small chance of getting one.) France's railways
are good, but its motorways have not kept pace with
the rest of Europe's.
Conclusion
Firms setting up plants away from Paris prefer to
invest in the east, where the infrastructure is better,
and where the rich markets of Europe's growth circle
can be tapped. France's regional planners are not
wholly unhappy about this. Like their counterparts
elsewhere in Europe, they sense the contradiction in
policies which try to push investors where they do not
wish to go. Faced with the choice of investing more in
Alsace-Lorraine, or even in the Paris region, and not
getting that investment at all, it is wiser to take the
investment. A strictly balanced system of incentives in
France would favour the south-west. But a glance at the
map shows how the north-east and rich Alsace-
Lorraine are favoured as well, and between 1968 and
1971 these two regions alone took over 50 per cent of
new jobs created by state-aided investment. And many
of the new medium-sized cities that the planners want
to expand are scattered in north-east France, along
the border- Lille/Rouboix/Tourcoing, Nancy/Metz,
Strasbourg. Regional planning in France has not
resisted the pull of Europe's economic heartland.
t2
Germany
Gernnny has as elaborate a system of regional aid as any country in the EEC, but
like its smaller neighbours in the Deutsche mark zone, the Benelux countries and
Denmark, one cannot help asking, what is it allfor? It is hard to believe on the streets
of Hamburg or Cologne that Germany has any poor areas. Far from lacking work.for
its people, Germany employs over two and a half million foreigners on its assembly lines,
sv,eeping the streets or serving food in hotels. Until it began to shoot up in the past fev'
months, Germany's unemployment rate remained enviably below one per cent between
1970 and 1973. And in 1973 the average earnings before tax throughout the country
*'ere f3,300.
Keeping its balance
For all the hollow laughter it may provoke in
Donegal or Calabria, the West German government
grants sizeable aids to 2l 'promotion areas' covering
over a third of the population. Germany now spends
about one billion D-marks a year on regional aid, over
half of which goes to Bavaria, with its over-large farm
labour force, and to Lower Saxony, a'poor' Land in
the north-east, surrounding the super-rich pocket of
Bremen. The other regions that benefit from special
help are the long border zone with East Germany and
the depressed coal mining region around Trier on the
border with Luxembourg.
The border zone (and West Berlin) were singled out
for special help as much for strategic as economic
reasons soon after the second world war. The border
was fixed by the meeting of four armies, and cities like
Kassel suddenly found themselves with a frontier
behind them and their markets cut in half. But it was
not until 1967, towards the end of a recession which
showed up patches of previously unnoticed industrial
decay, that the rich Liinder were hauled in to help the
poorer regions. Regional aid is now given under ajoint scheme run by the I I Lender governments and
the federal economic and finance ministries. Twice a
year, the economics ministers of the Liinder meet with
their two federal counterparts for economics and for
finance. Each side has ll votes, and it takes 17 votes
from the total of 22 to get a decision. That means that
it takes two federal ministers and six state ministers to
override the rest, so the neediest regions, in a minority,
need to make allies. The Liinder and federal govern-
ments split the regional aid bill 50-50, but once the
sums have been agreed and spending guidelines set,
the federal government fades into the background.
What goes where is then up to the individual econo-
mics ministers of the separate Lrinder to decide.
Not that the Liinder are more spendthrift than Bonn.
Between 1969 and 1972, 14,721aid applications were
granted and 14,351 rejected. But Bonn worries that
despite the neat looking figures for jobs created, no
one really has much idea how the money gets spent or
what good it does. And up until last year, the standards
for getting aid were drawn up more or less by political
haggling. Now stricter criteria have been established,
so that Bonn and the richer Liinder can get a better
idea of what is going on. The areas that will benefit in
future are called 'Kelmer areas' after the professor who
defined them. They are areas which are likely to havejob deficits by 1977 (that is, too many people for too
few jobs); low incomes per head compared with other
regions; and poor transport facilities, energy supplies
and schools. The new tests are meant to cut down the
number of areas receiving aid and to shift more money
into direct grants to local authorities so as to build up
the infrastructure. But as regional officials in the
economics ministry in Bonn admit, the new map does
not look much different from the old. Even Germany
does not escape the law that aid once given is hard to
take away.
Forward planning
This year, too, there are eight new public work
programmes, amounting to 900 million D-marks,
which are designed to help areas with declining indus-
tries and especially high unemployment. lnstead of
rushing in with aid after the damage has been done, the
Germans hope to start switching workers out of
declining industries before it is too late. That is why
aid goes to regions not just where unemployment rates
are now high but where unemployment is expected to
be high in the future. Regional planners claim that they
have been successful so far, and they talk of giving
special first-aid to cities like Wolfsburg in south-east
Lower Saxony, where the vast VW plant is in trouble.
It is not surprising that the country with the least
severe regional problems should have one of the most
successful systems of regional aid, for Germany is rich
and past success makes its economic managers
confident. Germany also starts out with huge advant-
ages that make the task of its regional planners that
much easier, for what is striking about Germany is the
lack of serious regional imbalances. lt is true that too
many Germans still work on farms, but their number
fell in the ten years up to 1970 from three and a half
million to just over two million, and Germany's
parties on the right have never made a point of support-
ing the peasants on the land at all cost 
- 
as the French
Gaullists have done. Moreover, unlike France and
Britain, Germany is not dominated by a single large
city. The capital is a provincial town one can drive
through without noticing it, chosen by Herr Konrad
Adenauer after the second world war because it was on
his home territory. Germany has no pressing need to
create metropoles d'iquilibre because it has them
already: 'Munich', in the words of regional planner in
Bonn, 'would never settle for being another Edinburgh'.
West Cermany, above all, owes history a debt in
having ll competitive Ldnder.
Much of the mrcdal ln this ksu hN been extracled from 'The Economist'(25.1.75) 
-'EEC's DevcloDment RegloN', edtted Edmmd Fawcetr, and ls reptlntcd
here by kind wmisEion. ll msl not be reoroduced wlthout consent.
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